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Comment
REVITALIZING THE YOUNGBERG V. ROMEO PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENT STANDARD TO REQUIRE TRAUMA-INFORMED
CARE FOR DETAINED CHILDREN
BY TAYLOR C. JOSEPH*
There are nearly 37,000 children detained in juvenile detention centers
in the United States.1 Of those children, 14,500 are detained prior to a final
adjudication on the delinquency charges against them.2 There are an
additional 14,000 immigrant children who are detained in care facilities after
entering the United States unaccompanied.3 Most, if not all, of these children
have experienced severe trauma.4 On average, each child who comes into
contact with the juvenile justice system has experienced at least four distinct
types of trauma, from domestic violence, to psychological maltreatment, to
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1. Melissa Sickmund et al., Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement,
NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST., https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/ (click “National Graphs” tab,
then hover over “19” within “Youth in residential placement – All offenses” graph) (last visited
Feb. 20, 2022) (showing that 36,479 children were detained in the United States in 2019).
2. Id. (click “National Crosstabs” tab, then select “2019” for “Year of Census,” and select
“Await juvenile court adjudication”; “Adjudicated-await disposition”; “Adjudicated-await
placement”; “Await transfer hearing”; and “Await criminal hearing,” for “Detailed Status,” then
click “Show Table”) (showing that 14,344 children were detained in 2019 while awaiting
adjudication, disposition, placement, transfer, or a criminal court hearing).
3. Latest UC Data – FY 2021, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Nov. 15, 2021),
https://www.hhs.gov/programs/social-services/unaccompanied-children/latest-uc-datafy2021/index.html.
4. Kathleen K. Miller et al., Applying Trauma-Informed Practices to the Care of Refugee and
Immigrant
Youth:
10
Clinical
Pearls,
CHILDREN
1
(Aug.
20,
2019),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6721394/pdf/children-06-00094.pdf (explaining
the “repeated and prolonged exposure to trauma” that many refugee and immigrant youth
experience, such as “significant trauma prior to migration, through civil war or unrest, destructive
effects of climate change, gang or drug related violence, or poverty”); U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT
OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CHILDREN EXPOSED TO VIOLENCE 171
(2012) [hereinafter DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT] (summarizing studies finding that children who
“come into contact with the juvenile justice system . . . have almost always been exposed to several
types of traumatic violence over a course of many years”).
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physical abuse.5 Similarly, unaccompanied immigrant children (“UCs”)6
often experience a variety of traumatic events prior to their arrival in the
United States, from gang violence, to neglect, to physical abuse.7
The Supreme Court has not determined which constitutional standard
should apply to determine whether the treatment of these children in
detention is constitutionally adequate.8 There are two available options: (1)
the Eighth Amendment “deliberate indifference” standard, adopted by the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals; and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment
“professional judgment” standard, adopted by the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals.9
This Comment argues that the Fourteenth Amendment
professional judgment standard should apply to both detained UCs and
allegedly delinquent children held in pre-disposition detention.10
First, Part I explores the circuit split over which standard—the
deliberate indifference standard or the professional judgment standard—
should apply to detained children, and it summarizes the legal status of UCs
and allegedly delinquent children.11 Next, Part II explains why the
professional judgment standard should apply to detained children, and argues
that under a revitalized professional judgment standard, trauma-informed
care should apply to both detained UCs and allegedly delinquent children
held in pre-disposition detention.12 Finally, Part III proposes concrete steps
towards making trauma-informed care a reality for detained children.13

5. Carly B. Dierkhising et al., Trauma Histories Among Justice-Involved Youth: Findings from
the National Child Traumatic Stress Network, 4 EUR. J. PSYCHOTRAUMATOLOGY (2013) (stating
that justice-involved youth have experienced an average of 4.9 different trauma types, including
“loss and bereavement,” “impaired caregiver,” “domestic violence,” “emotional
abuse/psychological maltreatment,” “physical maltreatment/abuse,” and “community violence”).
6. Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied: Guide to Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Mar. 17, 2021),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/policy-guidance/children-entering-united-states-unaccompaniedguide-terms (identifying “UC” as a common abbreviation for “unaccompanied child”).
7. Unaccompanied Migrant Children, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK (2015),
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/unaccompanied-migrant-children (listing traumatic events
experienced by UCs, including “lack of consistent caregivers,” “homelessness,” “violence,”
“physical injuries, infections, and diseases,” “forced labor,” “sexual assault,” “loss of loved ones,”
“war,” and “torture”).
8. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 n.37 (1977) (reserving the question of whether
the Eighth Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishments clause applies to juvenile institutions).
9. See infra Sections I.B, I.C.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part I.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
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I. BACKGROUND
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fourth Circuits
have diverged on whether to apply the professional judgment or deliberate
indifference standard to determine whether the State’s treatment of a detained
child is constitutional.14 The Third Circuit applies the deliberate indifference
standard,15 which originated in Estelle v. Gamble,16 a Supreme Court case
concerning the constitutionality of a prison’s treatment of a prisoner’s injury
under the Eighth Amendment.17 The Fourth Circuit relies on the professional
judgment standard18 set out in Youngberg v. Romeo,19 in which the Supreme
Court assessed the constitutionality of state medical treatment of an
involuntarily committed intellectually disabled individual under the liberty
prong of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.20
This Part is divided into four Sections. Section I.A discusses the circuit
split in detail.21 Section I.B examines the deliberate indifference standard.22
Section I.C examines the professional judgment standard.23 Finally, Section
I.D provides context for the legal status of detained children.24
A. The Circuit Split
In A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center,25 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference standard established in Estelle v. Gamble26 is the
appropriate standard to judge the constitutionality of the State’s treatment of
a detained child charged with delinquency.27 In Doe v. Shenandoah Valley
Juvenile Center Commission,28 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment

14. See A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying the
deliberate indifference standard); Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327 (4th
Cir. 2021) (applying the professional judgment standard).
15. A.M., 372 F.3d at 584.
16. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
18. Doe, 985 F.3d at 342.
19. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See infra Section II.A.
22. See infra Section II.B.
23. See infra Section II.C.
24. See infra Section II.D.
25. 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004).
26. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
27. A.M., 372 F.3d at 584.
28. 985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2021).
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standard established in Youngberg v. Romeo29 is the appropriate standard to
judge the constitutionality of the State’s treatment of a detained UC.30
1. Application of the Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference
Standard to Allegedly Delinquent Children Held in PreDisposition Detention—A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile
Detention Center
In A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center, the Third Circuit
applied the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard to hold that
a detention center housing delinquent children fails to provide a
constitutionally adequate level of care if it acts with deliberate indifference
to a child’s serious health needs.31
The plaintiff, A.M., was arrested at the age of thirteen for indecent
conduct.32 He was placed in a secure detention center for children charged
with delinquency in Pennsylvania called “the Center,” and he remained there
for about a month, until his disposition hearing.33 A.M. was previously
hospitalized on eleven occasions for psychiatric and behavioral problems,
including Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), anxiety,
depression, atypical bipolar disorder, and intermittent explosive disorder, all
of which were disclosed to the Center’s administrators and staff.34 A.M. was
physically assaulted by fellow juvenile detainees multiple times during his
stay at the Center.35 He was spit on, punched, hit, and punctured in the chest
with an unknown object, causing him to suffer bruises, wounds, black eyes,
and swollen lips.36 The Center initially did not provide A.M. with his ADHD
medication.37 Although a doctor performed a psychiatric evaluation of A.M.
about a week after his detention began and prescribed medication to reduce
his impulsiveness and motor restlessness, no other mental health professional
followed up or met with him for the duration of his time at the Center.38
The juvenile court committed A.M. to the Northwestern Intermediate
Treatment Facility (“Northwestern”) in Pennsylvania at his disposition
hearing.39 Upon A.M.’s arrival at Northwestern, a counselor observed that
he had a puncture wound on his chest, black and blue eyes, and that he was
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

457 U.S. 307 (1982).
985 F.3d at 342.
372 F.3d 572, 584 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 575.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 576–77.
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fearful other children would hurt him.40 The counselor filed a report of
suspected child abuse, and A.M. filed suit against the Center under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (“Section 1983”) and state tort law.41
The district court granted the Center’s motion for summary judgment
on all counts because it found no evidence to show that the Center acted with
deliberate indifference towards A.M.42 The Third Circuit held that A.M. had
protected Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in his personal security
and well-being, and that the question of whether those interests were violated
must be evaluated by the deliberate indifference standard, which it defined
as a middle ground between negligence and conduct so egregious that it
“shocks the conscience.”43 The court reasoned that the standard “is sensibly
employed only when actual deliberation is practical” and determined that the
custodial setting of a juvenile detention center obligates the officials in
charge to engage in forethought about detainees’ welfare.44 The Third Circuit
remanded the case to the district court because it found that A.M. had
presented sufficient evidence “to survive summary judgment on whether the
Center was deliberately indifferent to [his] mental health needs.”45
2. Application of the Fourteenth Amendment Professional Judgment
Standard to Detained Unaccompanied Immigrant Children—
Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission
In Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission, the Fourth
Circuit applied the Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment standard
to hold that a detention center housing UCs fails to provide a constitutionally
adequate level of care if it substantially departs from accepted professional
standards.46
The plaintiffs in Doe were a class of UCs placed by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) at
the Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center (“SVJC”) in Staunton, Virginia.47
Plaintiffs fled their native countries after experiencing extreme trauma.48
Plaintiffs fell under the care of ORR pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) because
they were unaccompanied by a parent or legal guardian upon their arrival to
the United States and had no parent or legal guardian in the United States

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 577.
Id.
Id. at 577–78.
Id. at 579 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998)).
Id. (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998)).
Id. at 584–85.
985 F.3d 327, 342 (4th Cir. 2021).
Id. at 329.
Id.
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who could care for them.49 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A), ORR must
promptly place UCs “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best interest
of the child,” and 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A) requires that such facility be
“capable of providing for the child’s physical and mental well-being.”50
SVJC was a secure juvenile detention center that housed both UCs and
local children who were charged with delinquency.51 It employed licensed
clinicians and provided some mental health services.52 However, SVJC was
unable to provide treatment for severe mental illness.53 The facility also
allowed its staff to engage in the use of force as discipline: Staff were
permitted to grab children, place children in handcuffs, shackles, or other
restraints, and strap children to chairs.54
The SVJC staff imposed extreme disciplinary measures on the UC
plaintiffs, including punches to the ribcage and face, physical restraints, and
solitary confinement.55 At least forty-five children intentionally hurt
themselves or attempted suicide at SVJC in a three-year period.56 A former
SVJC staff member testified that staff members allowed children to selfharm, joked about children’s erratic behavior, and made fun of children who
were physically restrained.57
The UC plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief under Section
1983 in federal court.58 The plaintiffs alleged that SVJC engaged in unlawful
conduct by its excessive use of force, physical restraints, and solitary
confinement, and by its failure to provide a constitutionally adequate level of
mental health care.59 The district court granted SVJC’s motion for summary
judgment with respect to the mental health care claim and applied the
deliberate indifference standard.60 The district court found that SVJC did not
display deliberate indifference in its mental health treatment of the
plaintiffs.61

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 330.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 331.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 333.
56. Id. at 333–34.
57. Id. at 334.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 335. The district court’s rationale for using the deliberate indifference standard was
simply that other courts had applied it to civil detainees.
61. Id.
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The Fourth Circuit reversed and held that the professional judgment
standard, not the deliberate indifference standard, governed.62 The court
distinguished cases cited by SVJC where courts applied the deliberate
indifference standard to immigrant detainees because the cases all involved
adults detained for enforcement proceedings, not UCs.63 The majority further
distinguished two cases cited by SVJC (including A.M. v. Luzerne County
Juvenile Detention Center, summarized above64) that applied the deliberate
indifference standard to detained children because the children involved were
not UCs, but rather juvenile delinquent detainees.65
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the statutory language in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1232(c)(2)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A) clearly indicates that UCs are
held in government custody for the purpose of giving them care.66 Therefore,
the court reasoned, the Youngberg professional judgment standard, which
was predicated on the fact that the plaintiff was held in a state institution for
the purpose of providing reasonable care and safety, governs the treatment of
detained UCs as well.67 The court further held that the professional judgment
standard is particularly necessary because children have unique
psychological needs that require a higher standard of care than adults.68 The
court suggested that trauma-informed care is a relevant standard of
professional judgment to consider when evaluating the care of detained
children.69 However, it did not determine whether trauma-informed care
should in fact be required for detained children under the professional
judgment standard.70
B. The Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference Standard
1. As Defined in Estelle v. Gamble
In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that a prison’s deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual treatment.71
The plaintiff, J.M. Gamble, was an inmate of the Texas Department of
Corrections.72 He was injured during prison work when a bale of cotton fell
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 339.
Id. at 342.
See supra Section I.A.1.
Doe, 985 F.3d at 342 n.14.
Id. at 339.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 344.
Id. at 346.
429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
Id. at 98.
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on him while he was unloading a truck.73 He soon developed severe back
pain.74 Numerous medical professionals examined Gamble over a period of
nearly three months following the accident.75 Gamble refused to work
because of the pain and was kept in “administrative segregation” as a result.76
A prison disciplinary committee placed Gamble in solitary confinement
about two months after his injury and refusal to work.77 Gamble filed a pro
se Section 1983 complaint against prison officials because of their failure to
provide him with proper medical treatment after his injury.78 The district
court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the court of
appeals reversed and remanded.79
The Supreme Court held that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence—
finding punishments that are incompatible with evolving standards of
decency and punishments that involve unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain to be unconstitutional—establishes the government’s obligation to
provide medical care for individuals who are punished by incarceration.80
The Court reasoned that a prison’s failure to provide a prisoner with medical
care could result in pain, suffering, and even death, which are unnecessary
and indecent consequences.81 These consequences amount to punishment
beyond the punitive sentence imposed by the court and are thus cruel and
unusual.82 Therefore, the Court concluded that a prison’s deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth
Amendment.83
2. Deliberate Indifference as Applied and Interpreted
An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim must prove that the
State’s conduct amounted to punishment of the detainee beyond the penalty

73. Id. at 99.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 99–101.
76. Id. at 100–01.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Id. at 98.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 102–03.
81. Id. at 103.
82. Id. at 103 (identifying “the government’s obligation to provide medical care for those whom
it is punishing by incarceration” and noting that “a failure [to provide medical care] may actually
produce physical ‘torture or a lingering death,’” though “[i]n less serious cases, denial of medical
care may result in pain and suffering which no one suggests would serve any penological purpose”
(quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890))).
83. Id. at 104. The Court ultimately concluded that Gamble did not present a cognizable Section
1983 claim because he was seen by medical professionals on multiple occasions after his injury and
because doctors diagnosed and treated his injury. Id. at 107.
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formally imposed for the crime.84 The Eighth Amendment is expressly about
punishment.85 To violate the Eighth Amendment, state conduct “that does
not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of
due care for the prisoner’s interests or safety.”86 The State’s harmful
treatment of the detainee must be wanton in order to violate the deliberate
indifference standard.87 “[I]nadvertence” or “error in good faith” do not
suffice.88 While “wantonness does not have a fixed meaning,” deliberate
indifference to a detainee’s medical needs meets the definition because the
State’s responsibility to provide medical care to those within its custody
ordinarily does not clash with other responsibilities.89 If there is a conflict
between providing treatment to a detained individual and the State’s
competing interests, such as prison safety, the deliberate indifference
standard does not apply because it does not adequately account for the State’s
need to make hasty decisions.90
The deliberate indifference standard is a subjective, not objective, test.91
A detainee must show that the state official both knew of and disregarded an
excessive risk to the individual’s health or safety.92 In other words, the state
official “must both be aware of facts from which [an] inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
the inference.”93 This subjective intent requirement is based in the Eighth
Amendment itself because of its ban only on cruel and unusual punishment.94

84. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (referencing Estelle for its acknowledgment that
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments “could be applied to some
deprivations that were not specifically part of the sentence but were suffered during imprisonment”).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”) (emphasis added).
86. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
87. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297–300 (summarizing cases explaining the wantonness requirement
under the Eighth Amendment).
88. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319.
89. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302 (citing to Whitley, 475 U.S. at 312, 320, for its holding that
deliberate indifference to medical needs constitutes wantonness).
90. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320. When the State acts under such emergency circumstances, “the
question whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering ultimately
turns on ‘whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or
maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,’” instead of whether the officials
acted with deliberate indifference. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (1973)).
91. See id. at 319 (“[I]t is obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in good faith,
that characterize the conduct prohibited by the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.”); see also
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (rejecting the “petitioner’s invitation to adopt an
objective test for deliberate indifference”).
92. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
93. Id.
94. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300 (stating that the source of the deliberate indifference subjective
intent requirement “is not the predilections of this Court, but the Eighth Amendment itself . . . . If
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The claimant must show that the state official actually intended to
deliberately cause the harm as a form of punishment beyond the claimant’s
sentence in order for the action to qualify as deliberate indifference.95 An
adjudicator may infer that a state official’s subjective state of mind exists if
the risk of harm is obvious.96 The deliberate indifference standard applies
both to the State’s failure to attend to a detainee’s medical needs, and to
allegations of inhumane conditions of confinement.97
C. The Fourteenth Amendment Professional Judgment Standard
1. As Defined in Youngberg v. Romeo
In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Supreme Court held that intellectually
disabled individuals who are involuntarily committed to state institutions
have protected liberty interests of safety and freedom from unreasonable
restraints under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.98 The
Court held that courts should employ a professional judgment standard to
evaluate whether the State violated an intellectually disabled individual’s
liberty interests.99
The plaintiff, Nicolas Romeo, was an adult man whose mental capacity
was equivalent to that of an eighteen-month-old child.100 A Pennsylvania
court committed Romeo to a state institution when he was twenty-six years
old.101 Romeo suffered over sixty injuries during his first two years in the
institution.102 Romeo’s mother filed a Section 1983 action on Romeo’s
behalf against three administrators of the state institution, claiming damages
for the alleged breach of Romeo’s constitutional rights to (1) safe conditions
of confinement; (2) freedom from bodily restraints; and (3) training or
habilitation under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.103
The district court jury returned a verdict for the defendants, which the
Third Circuit overturned.104 The Third Circuit found that the Eighth
the pain inflicted is not formally meted out as punishment . . . some mental element must be
attributed to the inflicting official”).
95. Id. (“The infliction of punishment is a deliberate act intended to chastise or deter. . . . [I]f
[a] guard accidentally stepped on [a] prisoner’s toe and broke it, this would not be punishment in
anything remotely like the accepted meaning of the word . . . .” (alterations in original) (quoting
Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir. 1985))).
96. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).
97. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303 (quoting LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391–92 (4th Cir. 1987)).
98. 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982).
99. Id. at 321.
100. Id. at 309.
101. Id. at 310.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 309.
104. Id. at 312.
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Amendment deliberate indifference standard, which the district court had
instructed the jury to rely on, was an inappropriate standard of liability
because it applies to individuals convicted of crimes, not to individuals
involuntarily committed due to intellectual disabilities.105 Instead, the Third
Circuit held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty interests,
including freedom of movement and personal security, was the proper basis
for the rights of the involuntarily committed.106
The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit and held that the district
court erred in applying the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
standard.107 Romeo was not held for a punitive purpose, and therefore the
Eighth Amendment did not apply to him.108 The Court based this conclusion
in its understanding that Romeo was detained for the purpose of providing
him care.109 The Court affirmed that involuntarily committed intellectually
disabled individuals have constitutionally protected liberty interests in
personal safety and freedom from bodily restraint under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.110
The Court acknowledged that certain restraints on these liberty interests
may be necessary in the context of an institution for the intellectually
disabled.111 Thus, it sought to determine when a restraint on a liberty interest
violates the Due Process Clause.112 It concluded that the Constitution only
requires the State to show that it exercised “professional judgment” in its
treatment of the involuntarily committed intellectually disabled individual.113
A “professional” may be anyone who is competent by education, training, or
experience to make the particular decision at issue about a committed
individual’s care.114 The Court held that a decision is presumptively valid if
it is determined by a qualified professional, so long as the professional’s

105. Id. at 312–13.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 312 n.11.
108. Id. at 312–13.
109. Id. at 320 n.27 (“[T]he purpose of respondent’s commitment was to provide reasonable care
and safety.”).
110. Id. at 315–16. The Court also held that these protected liberty interests require the State to
provide involuntarily committed intellectually disabled individuals with minimally adequate or
reasonable training or habilitation to ensure their safety and freedom from undue restraint. Id. at
319. The Court left open the question of whether an involuntarily committed intellectually disabled
individual has an independent constitutional claim to training or habilitation to preserve their selfcare skills from deteriorating during their commitment. Id. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 320.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 321.
114. Id. at 323 n.30.
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decision does not substantially depart from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards.115
2. Professional Judgment as Applied and Interpreted
Lower courts have applied and interpreted the Youngberg professional
judgment standard as a balancing test.116 First, a plaintiff must demonstrate
that the State restricted their Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty
interest in freedom of movement.117 Second, a plaintiff must show that the
State failed to exercise professional judgment in balancing the plaintiff’s
liberty interest against its own interest in restricting liberty.118
The professional judgment standard imposes a lower level of culpability
than the deliberate indifference standard.119 It is an objective test; it does not
require proof of subjective intent on the part of the state official.120 The Ninth
Circuit has described the professional judgment standard as “far more
stringent” than an ordinary tort negligence standard.121 The professional
judgment standard requires that “in the face of known threats to patient
safety, state officials . . . must take adequate steps in accordance with
professional standards to prevent harm from occurring.”122
The Second Circuit has held that an exercise of professional judgment
does not relate to whether a course of action would make the detained
individual safer, happier, or more productive; instead, it only determines
whether a decision meets professionally accepted minimum standards.123
The standard requires evaluating the judgment of the professional at the time
the decision was made.124 However, courts have also held that the
presumption that a professional’s decision was valid may be rebutted if there

115. Id. at 323.
116. See, e.g., Estate of Conners v. O’Connor, 846 F.2d 1205, 1208 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that “[u]nder Youngberg’s balancing test, the risk of harm and the burden on the state are weighed”);
C.J. v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 771 N.E.2d 539, 549 (2002) (stating that the Youngberg Court “found
the appropriate standard for balancing the individual’s liberty interests against the State’s asserted
reasons for restraining individual liberty is whether the State exercised professional judgment in
restricting the liberty interest”).
117. C.J., 771 N.E.2d at 549 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321).
118. Id.
119. Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2021).
120. Neely v. Feinstein, 50 F.3d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Youngberg professional
judgment standard is necessarily an objective test.”).
121. Estate of Conners, 846 F.2d at 1208.
122. Neely, 50 F.3d at 1508.
123. Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Child., Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984).
124. Id.
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is evidence, established by written policies or expert testimony, that those
decisions substantially departed from accepted professional standards.125
Lower federal courts and state courts have sharpened the professional
judgment standard. The Illinois Appellate Court has interpreted Youngberg
to mean that the State’s treatment of an individual must be “guided and
informed by ‘normal professional standards.’”126 The court acknowledged
that some courts have interpreted Youngberg’s professional judgment
standard to mean that any decision by a professional, “however outrageous it
may be,” is valid.127 However, a “careful reading of Youngberg . . . explodes
this interpretation” to reveal that “professional judgment” does not mean any
decision made by a professional, “but rather [any decision] synonymous with
accepted standards and practices within the relevant profession.”128
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin has
similarly framed the professional judgment standard as constrained by
constitutional values, such as the prevention of undue restraint, autonomy,
self-determination, and freedom from intrusion.129 To hold otherwise, by
determining that any judgment is valid so long as it is made by a professional,
would “substitute professional values for constitutional values and result in
an abdication by the courts of their obligation to protect individual rights.”130
Other courts have found that administrative considerations should not
factor into a court’s determination of whether an official properly exercised
professional judgment. For example, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina has held that consideration of state budgetary
constraints is inappropriate when determining whether an official exercised
professional judgment.131 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
125. See Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining that “the decisions
of the treating professionals are not conclusive”); see also Wells v. Franzen, 777 F.2d 1258, 1263
n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the professional judgment standard is based on norms set by mental
health professionals, and that state regulations constitute evidence of such norms); Lucas v. Peters,
741 N.E.2d 313, 324 (Ill. App. Dist. 2000) (“Deference to professional decisionmaking imposes a
concomitant judicial duty to ensure that the professional’s expertise was actually brought into
play.”); West v. Macht, 235 F. Supp. 2d 966, 981–82 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (“[Youngberg] does not
accept entirely unconstrained professional discretion. Rather, Youngberg articulated a substantive
standard that defines the limits within which professionals are authorized to exercise professional
judgment.”).
126. Lucas, 741 N.E.2d at 324 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. West, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 982.
130. Id. (citing Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to
Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 668 (1992)).
131. Thomas S. v. Morrow, 601 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (W.D.N.C. 1984) (finding that a “[p]laintiff
is entitled to treatment recommended by qualified professionals whose judgment is unsullied by
consideration of the fact that the state does not now provide appropriate treatment or funding for
appropriate treatment”).
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Pennsylvania has held that a professional judgment must be based “on
medical or psychological criteria and not on exigency, administrative
convenience, or other non-medical criteria” in order to merit deference from
a reviewing court.132
D. The Legal Status of Detained Children
The State has no affirmative duty to protect a child who is in their
parent’s custody.133 Only when the State affirmatively takes an individual
into its custody and holds them there against their will does the Constitution
impose a duty on the State to assume some responsibility for the individual’s
safety and general well-being under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.134 The State’s affirmative duty to protect exists under these
circumstances because it has imposed limitations on the individual’s freedom
to act on their own behalf by depriving them of certain Fourteenth
Amendment due process liberty interests.135
1. Legal Standards Governing Allegedly Delinquent Children
Children charged with delinquency in juvenile court proceedings are
entitled to constitutional rights akin to adults in criminal proceedings,
including the rights to (1) notice of court hearings and the alleged
misconduct; (2) counsel; (3) confrontation; and (4) the privilege against selfincrimination.136 Additionally, the double-jeopardy clause of the Fifth
Amendment prohibits the adult criminal prosecution of a child after a
conviction in juvenile court for the same offense.137 However, the Supreme
Court has also held that trial by jury is not a constitutional requirement in
juvenile court proceedings.138
The Supreme Court has upheld “preventive” detention of children
pending adjudication of an alleged delinquency charge if a judge finds there
is a “serious risk” that the child “may . . . commit an act which if committed
by an adult would constitute a crime.”139 Moreover, the Court has determined
that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of

132. Clark v. Cohen, 613 F. Supp. 684, 704 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
133. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200–01 (1989).
134. Id. at 199–200 (first citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976); then citing
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315–16 (1982)).
135. Id. at 200.
136. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 40, 55, 57 (1967).
137. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 541 (1975).
138. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).
139. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255–57 (1984).
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sentencing.”140 The Court has recognized that children may be reckless,
impulsive, and prone to risk-taking because of their lack of maturity and
underdeveloped sense of responsibility.141 A child’s character is not as wellformed as an adult’s, and children may be more vulnerable to peer or family
pressure than adults.142 Finally, several circuit courts and the federal
government have acknowledged that the aim of the juvenile justice system is
rehabilitation, not punishment.143
2. Legal Standards Governing Unaccompanied Immigrant Children
To be classified as a UC, a child must have “no lawful immigration
status in the United States,”144 be under the age of eighteen,145 and have either
“no parent or legal guardian in the United States” or “no parent or legal
guardian in the United States . . . available to provide care and physical
custody.”146
ORR is the main office charged with caring for UCs who have pending
immigration proceedings.147 ORR is required by statute to: (1) identify
qualified individuals, entities, and facilities to house UCs; (2) place children
in the care of those individuals or facilities; and (3) supervise those
individuals and facilities to ensure that they provide adequate care.148 ORR
must promptly place a UC “in the least restrictive setting that is in the best
interest of the child.”149 ORR may not place a UC with a person or entity
“unless the Secretary of Health and Human Services makes a determination

140. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (barring mandatory life without parole
sentences for children convicted of murder); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)
(prohibiting states from executing offenders for murder committed before they were eighteen years
of age); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (extending Roper to prohibit states from
imposing life without parole sentences on children convicted of nonhomicide offenses).
141. Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing to Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
142. Id.
143. A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Santana v. Collazo, 714
F.2d 1172, 1178 (1st Cir. 1983)) (stating that allegedly delinquent juveniles “are in a system whose
purpose is rehabilitative, not penal, in nature”); see also Points of Intervention, YOUTH.GOV,
https://youth.gov/youth-topics/juvenile-justice/points-intervention (last visited Feb. 24, 2022)
(“Detention [of children in the juvenile justice system] is not intended to be punitive.”).
144. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)(A).
145. Id. at § 279(g)(2)(B).
146. Id. at § 279(g)(2)(C).
147. Id. at § 279(a); see also Office of Refugee Resettlement; Statement of Organization,
Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 80 Fed. Reg. 3614, 3615 (Jan. 23, 2015) (stating that the
Office of the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement “oversees the care and custody of
unaccompanied alien children”).
148. Id. at § 279(b)(1)(A)–(L).
149. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2)(A).
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that the proposed custodian is capable of providing for the child’s physical
and mental well-being.”150
The 1997 Flores v. Reno settlement agreement mandates the standards
of detention for UCs.151 The Flores settlement required the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service152 to treat UCs with “dignity, respect
and special concern for their particular vulnerability as minors.”153 If a UC
cannot be released to a parent or other guardian, the Flores settlement
requires that the government temporarily place them in a program “licensed
by an appropriate state agency to provide residential, group, or foster care
services for dependent children.”154 The Flores settlement mandates that
facilities housing UCs provide for the child’s basic needs, including medical
assistance.155 The William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”) codified further protections to
ensure the “safe and secure placements” of UCs, and it also included a catchall provision requiring that subsequent regulations must “take into account
the specialized needs” of UCs.156
II. ANALYSIS
This Part argues that the Youngberg v. Romeo157 professional judgment
standard must apply to determine the constitutional adequacy of the State’s
treatment of both detained UCs and allegedly delinquent children held in predisposition detention. First, this Part explains that the purpose for an
individual’s detention is essential for determining whether the professional
judgment or deliberate indifference standard applies.158 Second, this Part
argues that the Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center
150. Id. at § 1232(c)(3)(A) (“[S]uch determination shall, at a minimum, include verification of
the custodian’s identity and relationship to the child, if any, as well as an independent finding that
the individual has not engaged in any activity that would indicate a potential risk to the child.”).
151. Stipulated Settlement Agreement (Flores Settlement), No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px) (C.D. Cal.
filed Jan. 17, 1997).
152. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 transferred responsibility over immigration from the
Immigration and Naturalization Service to Citizenship and Immigration Services and the
Department of Homeland Security, effective March 1, 2003. The transfer also gave ORR the
responsibility to care for UCs. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135 § 462 (2002).
153. See Flores Settlement, supra note 151, at 7.
154. See Flores Settlement, supra note 151, at 4, 12.
155. See Flores Settlement, supra note 151, at 7–8 (requiring that officials caring for detained
UCs must provide: (1) food and drinking water; (2) medical assistance in the event of emergencies;
(3) toilets and sinks; (4) adequate temperature control and ventilation; (5) adequate supervision to
protect minors from others; and (6) separation from unrelated adults whenever possible).
156. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5077, 5081 (2008).
157. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
158. See infra Section II.A.
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Commission159 correctly applied the Fourteenth Amendment professional
judgment standard to UCs because detained UCs may not be detained for a
punitive purpose.160 Third, this Part argues that the Third Circuit in A.M. v.
Luzerne County Juvenile Detention Center161 erred in applying the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard because allegedly delinquent
children held in pre-disposition detention may not be detained for a punitive
purpose.162 Fourth, this Part proposes that the professional judgment
standard be revitalized to focus on the accepted practices within a
professional field.163 Finally, this Part explains why trauma-informed care is
the appropriate standard of professional judgment that courts should use to
evaluate the constitutional adequacy of the State’s care of detained UCs and
allegedly delinquent children held in pre-disposition detention.164
A. The Purpose for an Individual’s Detention Determines Which
Standard Applies
The purpose for an individual’s detention determines whether the
Estelle Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard or the Youngberg
Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment standard applies. The
plaintiffs in both Estelle and Youngberg were detained by the State, were
therefore dependent on the State for care, and were abused while in state
custody.165 Yet despite these similarities, the Supreme Court reached
different holdings in Estelle and Youngberg because the plaintiffs were
detained for different purposes: The Estelle plaintiff was detained for the
purpose of punishment following a criminal conviction, whereas the
Youngberg plaintiff was civilly committed for the purpose of providing
care.166
The Court in Estelle concluded that the purpose of the plaintiff’s
detention was punishment because the plaintiff was a convicted inmate
sentenced to incarceration.167 The Court reasoned that the State’s failure to
provide medical treatment to a detainee could result in unnecessary and
159. 985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2021).
160. See infra Section II.A.1.
161. 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004).
162. See infra Section II.A.2.
163. See infra Section II.B.
164. See infra Section II.B.
165. Rose Carmen Goldberg, The Antidotes to the Double Standard: Protecting the Healthcare
Rights of Mentally Ill Inmates by Blurring the Line Between Estelle and Youngberg, 16 YALE J.
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 111, 114 (2015).
166. Id. at 115 (stating that the distinct purposes for the detentions in Youngberg and Estelle
“dictate unequal treatment standards, with inmates entitled to less care than the civilly committed
because the purpose of their confinement is punishment”).
167. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 98 (1976).
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wanton pain and suffering that would not “serve any penological purpose”
consistent with the Eighth Amendment.168 It developed the deliberate
indifference standard as a tool to determine whether the State’s treatment of
a detained individual exceeded the bounds of the punishment to which the
individual was sentenced.169 A necessary predicate for applying the standard,
then, is that the detained individual has already been sentenced to punishment
(i.e., is detained for a punitive purpose). The deliberate indifference standard
is thus properly applied in situations where an individual is detained for a
punitive purpose in order to determine if the State’s treatment of the
individual exceeded the bounds of the punishment to which the individual
was sentenced.
The Court in Youngberg determined that the purpose of the plaintiff’s
detention was care and treatment by looking to the state statute governing the
plaintiff’s commitment.170 The trial court in Youngberg applied the Estelle
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard.171 However, the
Supreme Court and Third Circuit explicitly rejected this approach because
the purpose for the Youngberg plaintiff’s confinement was treatment, not
punishment.172 The Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference standard, rooted in the presumption that the individual
is detained for a punitive purpose, cannot apply to an individual who is
detained for a rehabilitative or nonpunitive purpose.173 The professional
judgment standard instead provides an individual detained for a nonpunitive
purpose with “more robust protection” than the deliberate indifference
standard because individuals detained for a nonpunitive purpose may not
constitutionally be punished at all.174 The professional judgment standard is
thus properly applied in situations where an individual is detained for a
nonpunitive purpose to determine if the State’s treatment of that individual

168. Id. at 103.
169. Id.
170. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 310 (1982) (citing to 50 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4406(b)
(1969), which states that a court may order the commitment of a mentally disabled person “for care
and treatment”).
171. Id. at 312.
172. Id. at 321–22 (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. 97) (“Persons who have been involuntarily
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”); Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147,
156 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding that the Eighth Amendment is inappropriate in the context of civil rather
than criminal confinement).
173. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 312 (affirming the lower court’s judgment that the Eighth
Amendment is “not an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily
committed,” and noting that the Fourteenth Amendment provides “the proper constitutional basis
for these rights”); see also Goldberg, supra note 165, at 129 (explaining that Estelle’s “holding is
explicitly rooted in the Eighth Amendment’s fundamental protections”).
174. Goldberg, supra note 165, at 124.
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violated their Fourteenth Amendment due process liberty interests in
personal safety and freedom from bodily restraint.175
In sum, if the purpose for an individual’s detention is punitive, the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard applies. If the purpose
for an individual’s detention is nonpunitive, the Fourteenth Amendment
professional judgment standard applies.
In order to determine which standard should apply, a court must first
determine whether the purpose for the individual’s detention is punitive or
non-punitive. There are various factors a court may consider in making this
determination, including: “(1) legislative purpose clauses; (2) indeterminate
or determinate sentencing laws; (3) judges’ sentencing practices; (4)
institutional conditions of confinement; and (5) intervention outcomes.”176
Factors a court may consider in order to determine whether a particular act is
punitive include:
whether [it] involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether
it has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes
into play only on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will
promote the traditional aims of punishment—retribution and
deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is already a
crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned.177
As explained in the following Sections, consideration of these factors
reveals that neither UCs nor allegedly delinquent children held in predisposition detention may be detained for a punitive purpose.178 Therefore,
the deliberate indifference standard cannot apply, and the Fourteenth
Amendment professional judgment standard should control.179
1. The Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center
Commission Correctly Applied the Professional Judgment
Standard Because a UC May Not Be Detained for a Punitive
Purpose
Children and adult immigrants alike have the right to seek asylum under
international law.180 An individual who unlawfully enters the United States
175. Youngberg, 475 U.S. at 315–16.
176. Barry C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Courts, Youths in
Criminal Courts, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 485 (2017) (listing factors the Supreme Court has used to
distinguish punishment from treatment).
177. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168–69 (1963).
178. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
179. See infra Sections II.B, II.C.
180. G.A. Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948)
(“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.”); see
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for the first time is subject to civil, not criminal penalties.181 Neither an adult
immigrant nor a UC may be punished for simply entering the United States
to seek asylum.182
The statutes and policy governing UCs make it explicit that a UC may
not be detained for a punitive purpose, and that the government is instead
responsible for their care and well-being.183 The immigration system grants
UCs more protections than other immigrants in four key ways: (1) by
entrusting their custody to ORR; (2) by following the terms of the Flores
Settlement; (3) by amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act; and
(4) by juvenile docket accommodations in immigration court.184
By statute, ORR is required to ensure that UCs receive adequate care185
and that individuals or detention centers charged with caring for UCs are
“capable of providing for the child’s physical and mental well-being.”186
Legislative history reveals that Congress granted ORR jurisdiction over the
care of UCs because of its “‘child welfare expertise’ and ability to address
‘the psychological, emotional and other material needs’ of children.”187 The
Flores Settlement’s188 standards of detention for UCs require the federal
government to ensure that “children are detained for as short a period as
possible” and that “detention facilities address young people’s special
needs.”189 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act following

also Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 2 (Dec. 10, 1984) (stating that signatory parties are prohibited to “return . . .
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture”). The United States signed the Convention Against
Torture in 1988, but did not ratify it until 1994. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IV/IV-9.en.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 9, 2022).
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (stating that any individual who “enters or attempts to enter the United
States at any time or place other than as designated by immigration officers . . . shall, for the first
commission of any such offense, be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than [six] months”).
182. See supra note 180.
183. See infra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
184. Laila Hlass, The Adultification of Immigrant Children, 34 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 217
(2020).
185. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A)–(L).
186. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(3)(A).
187. See Hlass, supra note 184,184 at 218 (quoting Role of Immigration in the Department of
Homeland Security Pursuant to H.R. 5005, the Homeland Security Act of 2002: Hearing Before
Subcomm. on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong.
115 (2002) (statement of Kevin Appleby, Pol’y Dir. of the U.S. Conf. of Catholic Bishops Migration
and Refugee Services)).
188. Supra note 151.
189. Hlass, supra note 184, at 219–20.
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passage of the TVPRA190 expanded UCs’ access to forms of immigration
relief.191 Finally, some immigration courts have separated UC cases from the
regular docket in an effort to promote pro bono representation of UCs in their
removal defense.192
These intentional protections for UCs make it clear that the government
recognizes it has a responsibility to ensure UCs’ well-being, and that in doing
so, it must also treat them differently from adults. The government’s purpose
for detaining UCs is in no way punitive; instead, its stated purpose is to
provide care.193 UCs are similar to foster children in that the government
takes on the role of guardian because the UC by definition has “no parent or
legal guardian in the United States . . . available to provide care and physical
custody.”194 Like with foster children, the government’s only legitimate
purpose for taking custody of a UC is to protect them.195 The reality of
treatment of UCs in detention centers has been shown to differ greatly from
the care-based purpose for their detention.196 However, the legal purpose for
their detention remains to provide care, not to punish.197 Therefore, the
Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment standard, not the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard, should control.
The Fourth Circuit in Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center198
correctly held that the district court erred in applying the Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference standard to the UC plaintiffs because UCs may only
be detained for the purpose of providing care.199 The district court applied
190. William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008).
191. Hlass, supra note 184, at 220–21 (explaining that the TVPRA: (1) prohibited expedited
removal of Mexican and Canadian UCs arrested at the border; (2) gave UCs the opportunity to first
seek asylum before an asylum officer, rather than an immigration judge; (3) removed two bars to
asylum for UCs; and (4) included a “catch-all provision” that regulations pursuant to the Act must
consider the special needs of UCs).
192. Hlass, supra note 184, at 221–22.
193. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A).
194. Id. at § 279(g)(2)(C).
195. Andrea Koehler, The Forgotten Children of the Foster Care System: Making a Case for the
Professional Judgment Standard, 44 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 221, 249 (2014) (“[F]oster children
are not taken into state care for the purpose of punishment. In stark contrast, the singular societal
interest in foster care is the protection of the child.”).
196. Hlass, supra note 184, at 205 (arguing that “[i]nstead of addressing young people’s unique
vulnerabilities, the [immigration legal] system has permitted, and even supported, their physical
abuse, racial subordination, and dehumanization”); see generally Rebeca M. Lopez, Codifying the
Flores Settlement Agreement: Seeking to Protect Immigrant Children in U.S. Custody, 95 MARQ.
L. REV. 1635 (2012) (providing an overview of the mistreatment of UCs in U.S. custody and the
need for reform).
197. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A).
198. 985 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2021).
199. Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 985 F.3d 327, 329 (4th Cir. 2021); see also
8 U.S.C. §§ 1232(c)(2)(A), (3)(A).
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the deliberate indifference standard without inquiring into the purpose for the
UCs’ detention, even though it stated in a footnote that the professional
judgment standard applies to “programs with a treatment or rehabilitation
objective.”200 It did not, however, inquire into whether the detention of the
UCs had such an objective, or any objective at all.
The Fourth Circuit, by contrast, correctly examined the statutory and
regulatory framework governing UCs, as well as the detention center’s
cooperative agreement with ORR, in order to determine that the UC plaintiffs
could only be detained for the purpose of providing care.201 As discussed
earlier in this Section, the legal requirements for the detention of UCs support
the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion.202 And, based on its conclusion that the
government could only detain the UC plaintiffs to provide care, the Fourth
Circuit correctly held that the Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment
standard governed.203 This approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
purpose-focused analysis in Youngberg.204 The Fourth Circuit also
emphasized that the professional judgment standard was “particularly
warranted” because of the “unique psychological needs of children and the
state’s corresponding duty to care for them.”205
1. The Third Circuit in A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile Detention
Center Improperly Applied the Deliberate Indifference Standard
Because an Allegedly Delinquent Child Held in Pre-Disposition
Detention May Not be Detained for a Punitive Purpose
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, it is
unconstitutional for the State to punish an individual suspected of a crime
prior to an adjudication that the individual is guilty of the alleged offense.206
The State may detain an individual prior to a final adjudication to ensure their
presence at trial, but only so long as the conditions of such detention do not
amount to punishment.207 Any condition of confinement that amounts to
punishment prior to an individual’s conviction and sentencing is
unconstitutional.208
200. Doe v. Shenandoah Valley Juv. Ctr. Comm’n, 355 F. Supp. 3d 454, 468 n.12 (W.D. Va.
2018).
201. Doe, 985 F.3d at 339.
202. See supra notes 186–190 and accompanying text.
203. Doe, 985 F.3d at 339.
204. See supra Section II.A.
205. Doe, 985 F.3d at 342.
206. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
207. Id. at 536–37.
208. Id. at 535 (explaining that the “proper inquiry” to evaluate whether pretrial detention
conditions deprive an individual of liberty without due process of law is “whether those conditions
amount to punishment of the detainee”).
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The Eighth Amendment does not apply to individuals detained prior to
a final adjudication of guilt and sentencing because it only governs
individuals who may be lawfully punished.209 The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment instead governs the conditions of confinement for an
individual who has not yet been found guilty of a crime or sentenced to
punishment.210 Allegedly delinquent children held in pre-disposition
detention may be subject to even greater Fourteenth Amendment protections
than adults accused of crimes because of their vulnerable status as children.211
An allegedly delinquent child may be detained for a preventive,
nonpunitive purpose.212 In fact, the purpose of the entire juvenile justice
system is supposed to be rehabilitative, not punitive.213 In 1974, Congress
enacted the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act (“JJDP”),214
which created the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”), to support state and local efforts to
improve the juvenile justice system.215 Congress reauthorized the JJDP in
2002,216 and recently amended it through the Juvenile Justice Reform Act

209. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (expressing “considerable doubt that
the cruel and unusual punishment clause is properly applicable at all until after conviction and
sentence” and defining “punishment” as treatment “deliberately administered for a penal or
disciplinary purpose, with the apparent authorization of [the state]”).
210. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“[T]he State does not acquire the power
to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal
adjudication of guilt . . . . Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an
adjudication, the pertinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”); see Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that the
“more protective [F]ourteenth [A]mendment standard applies to conditions of confinement when
detainees, whether or not juveniles, have not been convicted,” and citing to cases applying a
Fourteenth Amendment standard, including Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)
(involuntarily committed mental patients); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979) (adult
pretrial detainees); and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (students disciplined at
school)); see also A.J. ex rel. L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that “the more
protective Fourteenth Amendment, and not the Eighth Amendment,” governs the status of a pretrial
detainee).
211. A.J., 56 F.3d at 854 (differentiating allegedly delinquent children from adults because: (1)
they have not had a judicial determination of probable cause; (2) they could be detained based on
unverified petitions such as delinquency petitions filed on information and belief; (3) the purpose
of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitative; and (4) juveniles may be detained for reasons separate
from adjudication of charges, such as neglect or abusive home environments).
212. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 255 (1984).
213. A.J., 56 F.3d at 854; see also Points of Intervention, YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youthtopics/juvenile-justice/points-intervention (last visited Feb. 23, 2022).
214. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 93-415, 88 Stat. 1109 (1975).
215. Legislation,
OFF.
OF
JUV.
JUST.
&
DELINQ.
PREVENTION,
https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about/legislation#:~:text=Authorizing%20Legislation&text=93%2D415%2C
%2042%20U.S.C.,and%20improve%20juvenile%20justice%20systems (last visited June 9, 2022).
216. 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107273, 116 Stat. 1758 (2002).
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(“JJRA”) of 2018.217 The JJRA amends the JJDP in part by adding the
following purpose: “to support a continuum of evidence-based or promising
programs . . . that are trauma informed, reflect the science of adolescent
development, and are designed to meet the needs of at-risk youth and youth
who come into contact with the justice system.”218
The federal government maintains that the “primary goals of the
juvenile justice system, in addition to maintaining public safety, are skill
development, habilitation, rehabilitation, addressing treatment needs, and
successful reintegration of youth into the community.”219 OJJDP works to
“protect children” and aims to ensure that contact between a child and the
juvenile justice system is “rare, fair, and beneficial to [the child].”220
Congress’s continuous attempts to improve juvenile justice systems to
better protect children shows that it intends to foster rehabilitative, rather than
punitive, juvenile justice systems.221 Despite this intended purpose, courts
have allowed a move towards a more punitive system for children who are
found to be delinquent and who are sentenced to incarceration in juvenile
detention centers.222 However, regardless of the contemporary erosion of
protections for children sentenced to “[p]unitive [d]elinquency
[d]ispositions,”223 children who have yet to be found delinquent or who have
not been sentenced to a punitive delinquency disposition may not be punished
because, prior to a final disposition on the delinquency charges against them,
the purpose of their detention remains indisputably preventive.224

217. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, 135 Stat. 5123 (2018).
218. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 101(4), 135 Stat. 5123, 5124
(2018).
219. Juvenile Justice, YOUTH.GOV, https://youth.gov/youth-topics/juvenile-justice (last visited
Feb. 24, 2022).
220. About OJJDP, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/about
(last visited June 9, 2022); see also Juvenile Justice System Structure & Process: Overview, OFF.
OF
JUV.
JUST.
AND
DELINQ.
PREVENTION,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/overview.html (last visited June 9, 2022)
[hereinafter OJJDP, Structure & Process] (“The juvenile justice system was founded on and guided
by the concept of rehabilitation through individualized justice.”).
221. See supra notes 213–218 and accompanying text.
222. Feld, supra note 176, at 478–79 (describing the evolution towards the contemporary
juvenile justice policies of “extensive pretrial detention, punitive delinquency sanctions, increased
transfer to criminal courts, and severe sentences as adults”). State legislative changes beginning in
the 1980s and 1990s “have moved the [juvenile] court away from its rehabilitative goals and toward
punishment and accountability” by allowing for punitive delinquency dispositions. Id. at 486–88.
223. Id. at 485.
224. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (holding that although preventive detention
of children may serve a legitimate governmental purpose, punitive detention of children prior to
final adjudication does not satisfy the fundamental fairness doctrine).
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The abuse that the plaintiff in A.M. v. Luzerne County Juvenile
Detention Center225 suffered took place while he was detained in a juvenile
detention center between the time of his arrest and the final disposition of his
case.226 The relevant Pennsylvania statutes governing A.M.’s detention,
which were not cited or discussed by the Third Circuit, authorize only
preventive detention of children.227 The statutes also require that if the court
finds the child to be delinquent, it must immediately or within a matter of
days determine whether the child should receive treatment, supervision, or
rehabilitation, or whether the child should be discharged from detention
altogether.228 In other words, the purpose for the child’s detention remains
preventive until a determination by the court that the child should receive
treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation.229 Therefore, A.M. was held in
preventive detention for the entire duration of his time in the detention center,
and thus for the entire duration of his abuse.230
Although the Third Circuit did not analyze the purpose for A.M.’s
detention, or discuss when or if a child may be punished, it agreed with A.M.
that A.M.’s claims were properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment
because he was “merely a juvenile detainee” and “not a convicted
prisoner.”231 And yet, the Third Circuit proceeded to apply the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard without mentioning the
Fourteenth Amendment professional judgment standard.232 The Third
Circuit reasoned that, because the Supreme Court has not defined states’ “due
process obligations to detainees with respect to medical care,” it properly
relied on deliberate indifference because “it is clear that detainees are entitled

225. 372 F.3d 572 (3d Cir. 2004).
226. Id. at 575.
227. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6325 (2000) (stating that a child may not be detained prior to
adjudication on the charges against them “unless [their] detention or care is required to protect the
person or property of others or of the child”).
228. Id. at § 6341.
229. Id. Notably, “punishment” is not included in the list of three permissible purposes for a
child’s continued detention.
230. See A.M., 372 F.3d at 577. At A.M.’s disposition hearing, the court ordered him committed
to a treatment facility, and he was removed from detention. Id. at 576–77. The Third Circuit is
unclear as to what hearings, if any, the juvenile court held on A.M.’s case during the one-month
period prior to the court’s final order; it only states that A.M. was arrested, held in the detention
facility, and committed one month later to a treatment facility. Id. at 575–77. However, even if the
juvenile court found A.M. delinquent at some point during his detention, A.M. still could not have
been detained for a punitive purpose because the court had yet to determine whether any continued
detention was for the purpose of treatment, supervision, or rehabilitation. 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 6325 (2000).
231. A.M., 372 F.3d at 584.
232. Id.

1354

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1329

to no less protection than a convicted prisoner is entitled to under the Eighth
Amendment.”233
However, a detainee may be entitled to more protection than a convicted
prisoner234—especially if he is a child, like A.M., who is held in preventive
detention while he awaits a final determination by the court on whether his
detention will even be continued. A child in A.M.’s position may not be
punished under any circumstances; both the statutory purpose of his detention
and the purpose of juvenile detention more generally reveal as much.235
Therefore, the Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard was
inapplicable, as the nonpunitive nature of A.M.’s detention necessarily meant
the Eighth Amendment was irrelevant, and the Fourteenth Amendment
governed.236 The Third Circuit correctly recognized this when it held that it
should analyze A.M.’s claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.237
However, the Third Circuit went astray when it proceeded to apply the Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference standard, despite its holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment applied.238 The Third Circuit failed to recognize that
the deliberate indifference standard is inextricable from the Eighth
Amendment, and therefore cannot serve as a test to determine whether
A.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated.239 Because the purpose
for A.M.’s detention was preventive, not punitive, and thus governed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, the Third Circuit should
have evaluated his claim under the professional judgment standard rather
than the deliberate indifference standard.
B. The Professional Judgment Standard Must be Revitalized to Focus
on the Accepted Practices Within a Professional Field
Both the professional judgment and the deliberate indifference
standards are ambiguous.240 The only guidance that the Supreme Court gave
233. Id.
234. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015) (“[A] pretrial detainee can prevail
[on a claim that their due process rights were violated] by providing only objective evidence that
the challenged governmental action is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental objective
or that it is excessive in relation to that purpose.”).
235. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6325 (2000) (the statutory basis for A.M.’s detention); Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984) (authorizing only preventive detention of children).
236. See Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1032 (2d Cir. 1973) (expressing “considerable doubt
that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is properly applicable at all until after conviction and
sentence”).
237. A.M., 372 F.3d at 584.
238. See id. (analyzing A.M.’s claim under the deliberate indifference standard).
239. See supra Section II.A.
240. Brendan P. Kearse, Abused Again: Competing Constitutional Standards for the State’s Duty
to Protect Foster Children, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 385, 401 (1996) (arguing that in the
context of the standards’ application to foster children, both the deliberate indifference and
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to lower courts when it introduced the professional judgment standard was
that a “professional” is anyone competent by education, training, or
experience to make the decision about the individual’s care, and that a
professional’s judgment is presumptively valid so long as it does not
substantially depart from accepted professional judgment, practice, or
standards.241 This definition leaves courts with much deference but little
guidance for how to exercise it.242 Take the professional judgment standard’s
deference to the professional too far, and a court could allow for
unconstitutional treatment of the individual under the professional’s care.243
Courts should not accept a decision as valid under the professional judgment
standard simply because it is made by someone who is a professional. 244
Lower courts have confronted this conundrum and clarified the
standard.245 Rather than allowing for unlimited discretion, the professional
judgment standard “defines the limits within which professionals are
authorized to exercise professional judgment.”246 And courts are “the most
appropriate forum in which to arbitrate competing expert opinions” on what
constitutes proper professional judgment because they enable compromise
when professionals disagree.247 Courts should look to the accepted and
standard practices within the professional’s field and determine whether the
professional’s actions met those specific standards.248 If a professional’s

professional judgment standards “have been interpreted by the lower courts to establish so many
different standards of liability that they have no practical constitutional meaning, and no ability to
guide either courts or state administrators in their official duties”).
241. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982).
242. Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the “Experts”: From Deference to Abdication Under
the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 639, 644 (1992) (arguing that the Youngberg
professional judgment standard “does not clearly delineate the scope of a professional’s
responsibilities,” “indicate who is a professional,” or “distinguish professional decisions that are
subject to the professional judgment standard from those that are not”); see also Cathy Hershcopf,
Constitutional Law—Mental Health Law—Right to Treatment—Youngberg v. Romeo, 29 N.Y. L.
SCH. L. REV. 513, 534 (1984) (“[Youngberg’s] vague standard is a shortcoming of the
case. . . . There is great tension between the right being recognized and the enormously powerful
language concerning deference to professionals.”).
243. Stefan, supra note 242, at 645 (“Constitutional rights transcend professional judgment, and
in many respects professional judgment is irrelevant or antithetical to the exercise of these rights.”).
Stefan also contends that the professional judgment standard has allowed courts to “abdicate their
fact-finding and decisionmaking responsibilities, creating a significant threat to the preservation of
civil rights.” Id.
244. Lucas v. Peters, 741 N.E.2d 313, 324 (2000).
245. See supra Section I.C.2.
246. West v. Macht, 235 F. Supp. 2d 966, 981–82 (E.D. Wis. 2002).
247. Hershcopf, supra note 242, at 535–37.
248. See West, 235 F. Supp. at 984 (“[A] substantial departure from . . . standards [adopted by
relevant professional organizations] may be evidence of the violation of the professional judgment
rule.”).
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decision falls outside of those bounds, the professional judgment standard
has not been met.
This approach not only provides clearer guidance for courts in
determining if a professional’s conduct is acceptable, but also ensures
protection of constitutional rights that could be neglected under the more
ambiguous definition of the standard.249 A revitalized professional judgment
standard must therefore ask whether the professional’s decision conformed
to the accepted and standard practices within their professional field as a
whole.
1. Trauma-Informed Care Is the Appropriate Standard of
Professional Judgment to Evaluate the Constitutional Adequacy
of State Treatment of Detained UCs and Allegedly Delinquent
Children Held in Pre-Disposition Detention
When applying the revitalized professional judgment standard to
detained UCs and allegedly delinquent children held in pre-disposition
detention, a court should look to the accepted and standard practices within
the professional fields dedicated to those groups of children. Such an inquiry
quickly confirms what the Fourth Circuit suggests in Doe v. Shenandoah
Valley Juvenile Center Commission: Trauma-informed care is the proper
standard for evaluating whether the State exercised professional judgment in
its care of detained children.250
Trauma-informed care “realizes the widespread impact of trauma and
understands potential paths for recovery; recognizes the signs and symptoms
of trauma in clients, families, staff, and others involved with the system; and
responds by fully integrating knowledge about trauma into policies,
procedures, and practices, and seeks to actively resist re-traumatization.”251
A 2012 U.S. Department of Justice task force organized by then-Attorney
General Holder recommended that “trauma-informed screening, assessment,
and care [be] the standard in juvenile justice services,” including for children
diverted out of detention to other juvenile justice programs.252 The task force
249. Stefan, supra note 242, at 645; see also West, 235 F. Supp. at 982 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (citing
Stefan, supra note 242, at 668).
250. 985 F.3d 327, 345 (4th Cir. 2021).
251. SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND MENTAL HEALTH SERV. ADMIN., SAMHSA’S CONCEPT OF
TRAUMA AND GUIDANCE FOR A TRAUMA-INFORMED APPROACH 9 (2014); see also Juvenile
Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 102(8), 135 Stat. 5123, 5126 (2018) (defining
the term “trauma-informed” as: “(A) understanding the impact that exposure to violence and trauma
have on a youth’s physical, psychological, and psychosocial development; (B) recognizing when a
youth has been exposed to violence and trauma and is in need of help to recover from the adverse
impacts of trauma; and (C) responding in ways that resist retraumatization.”).
252. DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 12, 14, 175 (recommending that “every
professional and advocate serving children exposed to violence and psychological trauma learns
and provides trauma-informed care”; that “professional societies develop, adopt, disseminate, and
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advocated for the eradication of “correctional practices that traumatize
children and further reduce their opportunities to become productive
members of society.”253 It stated that a primary goal of the juvenile justice
system must be to “address[] youths’ mental health needs to enable juvenile
justice programs and facilities to successfully achieve their original goals of
safety, justice, and rehabilitation.”254 The JJRA requires that, in order to
receive federal funding for juvenile justice, states must create juvenile justice
plans that, among other requirements, “promote evidence-based and traumainformed programs and practices.”255
A 2015 ORR guide for UC care provider facilities similarly
recommends that providers exercise trauma-informed care, including
“trauma-informed interviewing, assessment, observation, and other
techniques”; “[w]orkforce training on trauma and its impact on the
developing brain and behavior”; and “incorporating an understanding of the
prevalence and impact of trauma, as well as the complex paths to healing and
recovery, into all aspects of service delivery.”256 ORR also dissuades the use
of restraints and seclusion on UCs because it risks exacerbating their
trauma.257
National professional organizations comprised of experts in child
trauma, juvenile justice, and immigrant children agree that trauma-informed
care is essential for detained children.258 A court applying a revitalized
implement principles, practices, and standards for comprehensive evidence-based treatment of
children exposed to violence or psychological trauma”; and that “everyone in the juvenile justice
system, including program staff and administrators, judges, attorneys, and probation officers . . . be
educated about the importance and benefits of providing appropriate trauma-informed services to
youth in the system”).
253. DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 177 (emphasizing that punitive sanctions must
be abandoned “both to protect [the children] from further harm and to avoid teaching them by
example that violence is an appropriate means to control other people’s behavior”).
254. DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 177.
255. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205(1)(E)(ii)(II), 135 Stat.
5123, 5133 (2018).
256. Children Entering the United States Unaccompanied: Section 3, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH
AND
HUMAN SERVS., OFF. OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (Apr. 20, 2015),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/orr/policy-guidance/children-entering-united-states-unaccompaniedsection-3.
257. Id. (“For children who have experienced traumatic events, the use of restraints and seclusion
often replicates the experience of abuse and poses a barrier to healing and recovery. Therefore,
every effort should be made to prevent the need for use of restraints and seclusion.”).
258. The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, the National Child Traumatic
Stress Network, and the National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice all recommend
using trauma-informed care for children in detention. See Resolution Regarding Trauma-Informed
Juvenile and Family Courts, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
https://www.ncjfcj.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/regarding-trauma-informed-juvenile-andfamily-courts.pdf (last visited June 9, 2022) (urging “juvenile and family courts to be traumainformed by engaging stakeholders” and “by responding to the deleterious effects of trauma and
associated conditions through proactive and consistent efforts to reduce potential trauma reminders,
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professional judgment standard should take these organizations’ mandates
into account whenever it assesses a professional’s care of a detained UC or
an allegedly delinquent child held in pre-disposition detention. If a
professional working with a detained UC or an allegedly delinquent child
held in pre-disposition detention did not exercise trauma-informed care, the
court should find that they did not satisfy the professional judgment standard
because they failed to act in accordance with the accepted and standard
practice of using trauma-informed care with detained children.
2. The Revitalized Professional Judgment Standard Best Accounts
for the Particular Vulnerabilities of Detained Children
The Supreme Court has recognized that the government has an
important interest in protecting the welfare of the nation’s children259 and
preventing child abuse and neglect.260 The State may have an interest in
detaining a child for either a preventive purpose, as in the case of allegedly
delinquent children held in pre-disposition detention, or for a caregiving
purpose, as in the case of detained UCs.261 At no time does the State have a
valid interest in detaining these children for the purpose of punishment.262

ensure safety, nourish self-determination, and promote prosocial connections”); Sue Burrell,
Trauma and the Environment of Care in Juvenile Institutions, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS
NETWORK
2,
(Aug.
2013),
https://www.nctsn.org/sites/default/files/resources//trauma_and_environment_of_care_in_juvenile
_institutions.pdf (stating that “the empirical work on trauma exposure and PTSD holds great
potential for juvenile system professionals as a tool to inform our decisions about the use of
incarceration and institutional practices” and that “[r]ecent evidence of institutional abuses confirms
the need for attention to trauma-informed care”); NAT’L CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH & JUV. JUST.
AT POL’Y RSCH. ASSOCS. & TECH. ASSISTANCE COLLABORATIVE, STRENGTHENING OUR FUTURE:
KEY ELEMENTS TO DEVELOPING A TRAUMA-INFORMED JUVENILE JUSTICE DIVERSION PROGRAM
FOR
YOUTH
WITH
BEHAVIORAL
HEALTH
CONDITIONS
1
(Jan.
2016),
https://ncyoj.policyresearchinc.org/img/resources/2016-Publication-Strengthening-Our-Future089881.pdf [hereinafter STRENGTHENING OUR FUTURE] (explaining that a trauma-informed
approach for the juvenile justice system is necessary because the “majority of youth in contact with
the juvenile justice system in this country have a diagnosable behavioral health condition”). The
American Academy of Pediatrics also recommends trauma-informed care when working with
immigrant and refugee children. Julie M. Linton et al., Detention of Immigrant Children,
PEDIATRICS
(May
1,
2017),
https://publications.aap.org/pediatrics/article/139/5/e20170483/38727/Detention-of-ImmigrantChildren (“Children, especially those who have been exposed to trauma and violence, should not be
placed in settings that do not meet basic standards for children’s physical and mental health and that
expose children to additional risk, fear, and trauma.”).
259. See Koehler, supra note 195, at 245 n.179 (first citing Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865; then
citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990); and then citing Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981)).
260. See Koehler, supra note 195, at 246.
261. See supra Section I.D.
262. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
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Most, if not all, UCs have experienced trauma.263 The same is true for
children entangled in the juvenile justice system.264 Exposure to trauma early
in life has devastating effects on children and leads to negative outcomes as
varied as “changes in brain size, structure, and function; alterations in neural
pathways associated with learning, memory, and self-regulation; a
heightened baseline state of arousal and anxiety; and increased sensitivity to
internal and external trauma reminders.”265 Trauma also has “profound
negative effects on emotional regulation, behavior, cognition, relationships,
self-concept, and academic success.”266
Traumatized children have
unquestionable interests not only in safety and security under the liberty
prong of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also in
avoiding the exacerbation of the trauma they have already experienced.267
When weighed against the State’s interest in detaining children, the
interests of these children clearly prevail.268 Such an analysis quickly
confirms what this Comment has already argued: that the professional
judgment standard must apply to detained UCs and allegedly delinquent
children held in pre-disposition detention.269
It is clear that detention harms children.270 If and when the State has a
valid interest in detaining a child, it has a duty to mitigate the harm that
263. Miller et al., supra note 4 (detailing the “repeated and prolonged exposure to trauma” that
many refugee and immigrant youth experience before, during, and after migration).
264. See DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 171 (summarizing studies finding that
children who “come into contact with the juvenile justice system . . . have almost always been
exposed to several types of traumatic violence over a course of many years”); Elizabeth Stoffel et
al., Assessing Trauma for Juvenile and Family Courts, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES
7 (2019) (noting that “youth involved in the juvenile justice system tend to have higher rates of early
adverse experiences” and that “nearly all youth who enter the juvenile justice system have histories
of exposure to trauma, with many justice-involved youth reporting exposure to chronic trauma
across childhood and adolescence”); Burrell, supra note 258, at 1 (stating that children in the
juvenile justice system “are among the most vulnerable youth in our society” and noting that
“[a]lmost all have experienced trauma in some form, and many suffer from Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder”).
265. JASON BRENNEN ET AL., BUILDING A MULTI-SYSTEM TRAUMA-INFORMED
COLLABORATIVE: A GUIDE FOR ADOPTING A CROSS-SYSTEM, TRAUMA-INFORMED APPROACH
AMONG
CHILD-SERVING
AGENCIES
AND
THEIR
PARTNERS
8
(2019),
https://www.chapinhall.org/wp-content/uploads/PDF/Multi-System-Trauma-Informed-CareMSTIC-Guide.pdf.
266. Id.
267. See Linton et al., supra note 258, at 1 (“From the moment [UCs] are in the custody of the
United States, they deserve health care that meets guideline-based standards, treatment that
mitigates harm or traumatization, and services that support their health and well-being.”).
268. Koehler, supra note 195, at 244 (arguing for a balancing test to determine the standard of
care for foster children and concluding that the professional judgment standard should apply).
269. See supra Section II.A.
270. See DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 175 (summarizing studies reporting
“nearly [ten] assaults a day, on average” suffered by children in juvenile detention facilities, as well
as the ways in which routine detention practices “can bring additional harm to already traumatized
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detention may cause, consistent with its own interest in protecting the welfare
of children and the child’s interest in avoiding re-traumatization.271 The State
must also ensure that the trauma of detention itself does not rob the child of
self-care skills or coping mechanisms they may have developed prior to their
detention.272 These skills may include “planning, positive reframing, seeking
emotional support, [and] seeking instrumental support,” among others.273 In
his Youngberg concurrence, Justice Blackmun left the door open for a future
claim that the State must provide “such training as is reasonably necessary to
prevent a person’s pre-existing self-care skills from deteriorating because of
his commitment.”274 This claim is particularly relevant in the context of
detained children who have experienced trauma because of the clear
connection between detention and exacerbation of pre-existing trauma.275
The exacerbation of trauma caused by detention may lead to a deterioration
in the child’s overall condition, including the weakening or destruction of
any coping mechanisms or self-care skills the child may have developed to
address their pre-existing trauma prior to detention.276 The State’s interest in
detaining a traumatized child is inconsistent with these adverse outcomes if
it also maintains its interest in protecting the welfare of children, and if it
purports to only detain children for the purpose of providing care or
rehabilitation.277 Thus, whenever the State detains a child who has
experienced trauma, it must ensure that the child is able to maintain the selfcare or coping skills they developed prior to their detention, in addition to
ensuring that the detention itself does not further traumatize the child.278
youth”); see also Burrell, supra note 258, at 2 (“Removal of a child from the home . . . is itself a
traumatic event. Loss of liberty, personal identity, and the familiar landscape of daily life is a
frightening, disorienting, and life-changing event for a person of any age, but it is especially so for
young people.”).
271. See generally Burrell, supra note 258 (outlining the risks of re-traumatization of children
in detention).
272. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 327 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (suggesting
that an involuntarily committed individual may have an independent constitutional claim under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to “training necessary to preserve . . . basic selfcare skills”).
273. Elizabeth P. Shulman & Elizabeth Cauffman, Coping While Incarcerated: A Study of Male
Juvenile Offenders, J. RES. ADOLESC. 818, 820 (2011).
274. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
275. See DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 85 (“Current treatment models, void of
trauma-informed care components, in fact may actually exacerbate the child’s symptoms, causing
further harm to the child survivor . . . .”).
276. See Shulman & Cauffman, supra note 273, at 819 (finding that “incarceration may
undermine the effectiveness of . . . coping strategies”).
277. See supra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2.
278. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 329 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (expressing openness to a future
argument that the State is “constitutionally required to provide” an involuntarily committed
individual with training to maintain basic self-care skills, “even if [the individual]’s safety and
mobility [are] not imminently threatened by [the State’s] failure to do so”).
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Trauma-informed care best accommodates both the State’s interest in
limiting the adverse outcomes for detained children and the child’s interests
in safety, security, preservation of self-care and coping skills, and prevention
of re-traumatization because its entire purpose is to “recognize and respond
to trauma and to prevent and mitigate the negative effects of adversity.”279
Trauma-informed care may even “reverse the adverse effects of violence and
psychological trauma and put children back on a healthy developmental
course.”280 In other words, trauma-informed care has the potential to not only
fulfill the State’s duty of ensuring a child’s condition does not deteriorate as
a result of detention, but also to go beyond that duty and improve the child’s
pre-existing condition.281 Widespread adoption of trauma-informed care for
these vulnerable child populations could have enormous positive outcomes
not only on the children themselves, but on society at large.282 Traumainformed care thus satisfies both the State’s and child’s interests in
preventing further harm to the child. A revitalized professional judgment
standard would make it clear to courts and the State that, in order to be
constitutionally adequate, the State’s treatment of detained UCs and allegedly
delinquent children held in pre-disposition detention must comply with
trauma-informed care.283
III. OPERATIONALIZATION
The question of how to make trauma-informed care a reality for detained
children is a complicated one. This Part proposes the following three-step
approach: (1) ORR and OJJDP should distribute trauma-informed care
guidance to detention centers housing children;284 (2) attorneys representing
detained children in Section 1983 and prospective injunctive relief claims
should clearly present trauma-informed care as the relevant standard of
professional judgment to the court;285 and (3) courts themselves must be
trauma-informed.286

279. See BRENNEN ET AL., supra note 265, at 9.
280. See DOJ, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 4, at 81.
281. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 327 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (proposing that the State has a
duty to prevent an involuntarily committed individual’s self-care skills from deteriorating because
of their commitment).
282. See STRENGTHENING OUR FUTURE, supra note 258, at 13 (explaining that implementing a
trauma-informed approach in the juvenile justice system may lead to “reduced recidivism, reduced
criminal and delinquent acts, fewer police and justice system contacts, greater adherence to
probation supervision and diversion conditions, improved school performance and attendance, and
improved relationships with families and peers”).
283. See supra Section II.B.2.
284. See infra Section III.A.
285. See infra Section III.B.
286. See infra Section III.C.
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A. The Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Should Distribute Trauma-Informed
Care Guidance to Detention Centers Housing Children
Government agencies that fund and oversee detention centers housing
children should harness the expertise of independent organizations to create
and distribute trauma-informed care implementation plans to detention
centers.
Efforts are already underway to increase trauma-informed care for
detained children. The JJRA requires states to create “plan[s] to promote
evidence-based and trauma-informed programs and practices” in order to
receive federal grants for juvenile delinquency prevention programs.287 ORR
requires that facilities housing UCs train their staff in “techniques for childfriendly and trauma-informed interviewing, assessment, [and]
observation.”288 ORR also encourages “[w]orkforce training on trauma and
its impact on the developing brain and behavior,” creation of “a prevention
first approach to the use of restraints and seclusion” by “incorporating an
understanding of the prevalence and impact of trauma,” and implementation
of “trauma-informed approaches promoting safety and respect.”289 However,
neither the JJRA nor ORR guidelines provide specific steps for state officials
who oversee detention centers housing children to take to implement traumainformed care, and the process of “transform[ing] the guiding principles of
trauma-informed care to concrete policies” is still underway.290
ORR and OJJDP should lead in implementing trauma-informed care for
detained children. ORR is the federal government agency that oversees the
care of detained UCs.291 States, rather than the federal government, oversee
detention centers housing allegedly delinquent children.292 However, OJJDP
provides hundreds of millions of dollars in grant funding to states, local
governments, tribal jurisdictions, and community organizations each year to
administer juvenile justice programs.293 Because of its wide reach and
influence on the local administration of juvenile justice programs, OJJDP
287. Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-385, § 205(1)(E)(ii)(II), 135 Stat.
5123, 5133 (2018).
288. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
289. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
290. Nicole McKenna, Trauma-Informed Care in Youth Detention: A National Portrait, INT’L
ASS’N
FOR
CORRECTION
&
FORENSIC
PSYCH.
(June
15,
2021),
https://www.myiacfp.org/2021/06/15/trauma-informed-care-in-youth-detention-a-nationalportrait/.
291. 6 U.S.C. § 279(a)–(b).
292. See OJJDP, Structure & Process, supra note 220 (describing the structure of the juvenile
justice system).
293. Funding, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION, https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/funding (last
visited June 9, 2022).

2022] REVITALIZING THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD

1363

may serve as a central reference point for the various state and local entities
that oversee the detention of allegedly delinquent children.
There are a multitude of trauma-informed “interventions, instruments,
and curriculums” that detention centers housing children might use to
implement trauma-informed care.294 There is no consensus as to which
program is best, or whether one program is better than another for a particular
group of children.295 State officials who oversee detention centers housing
children would benefit from having a central government agency to look to—
ORR for centers housing UCs, OJJDP for centers housing allegedly
delinquent children—for clear guidance on how to implement traumainformed care.296 Absent such guidance, it will be difficult for individual
state officials to evaluate the available options in order to determine which
trauma-informed care implementation program best suits their detention
center and child population.297
ORR and OJJDP should harness the expertise of organizations already
working in the area of child trauma to curate trauma-informed care
implementation plans for detention centers. ORR and OJJDP should start
with the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (“NCTSN”), which is a
leader in trauma-informed care implementation for children.298 NCTSN has
already developed a plethora of trauma-informed care resources, including
webinars, training curriculums, and e-Learning courses.299 A collaboration
between ORR, OJJDP, and NCTSN could allow NCTSN to identify specific
materials already within its catalogue that would best suit detention centers
294. Precious Skinner-Osei et al., Justice-Involved Youth and Trauma-Informed Interventions,
JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2019, at 1, 12 (providing an overview of the most common trauma-informed
implementation plans, including “the Trauma and Grief Components Therapy for Adolescents
(TGCTA), Cognitive Processing Therapy (CPT), Trauma-Adapted Multidimensional Treatment
Foster Care (TA-MTCF), the Attitudes Related to Trauma-Informed Care [ARTIC] questionnaire,
and the Think Trauma Curriculum,” as well as the “Sanctuary Model and [the] Trauma Affect
Regulation Guide for Education and Therapy [TARGET]”).
295. See McKenna, supra note 290.
296. See Skinner-Osei et al., supra note 294, at 11.
297. See Skinner-Osei et al., supra note 294, at 12.
298. Who We Are, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, https://www.nctsn.org/aboutus/who-we-are (last visited Feb. 27, 2022) (explaining that “the NCTSN has trained more than two
million professionals in trauma-informed interventions”).
299. See, e.g., All NCTSN Resources, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/all-nctsn-resources (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); Think Trauma: A
Training for Working with Justice Involved Youth, 2nd Edition, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS
NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/think-trauma-training-working-justice-involvedyouth-2nd-edition (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); Complex Trauma: Facts for Directors,
Administrators, and Staff in Residential Settings, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/complex-trauma-facts-directors-administrators-and-staffresidential-settings (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); Screening and Assessment in the Juvenile Justice
System, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/screeningand-assessment-juvenile-justice-system (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
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housing UCs and allegedly delinquent children.300 If ideal materials do not
already exist, NCTSN could tap into its network of trauma-informed care
professionals to develop what is needed.301 Then, ORR and OJJDP could
make NCTSN’s recommended resources available on their respective
websites, along with clear instructions for which trainings or programs the
state officials who oversee the detention centers should implement and in
what order. The centralized organization and distribution of traumainformed care resources by ORR and OJJDP will save state officials the
confusion of determining on their own what they need to do to comply with
JJRA and ORR guidance and will enable them to actually take the necessary
steps to implement trauma-informed care for detained children.302
B. Children’s Rights Attorneys Should Clearly Document TraumaInformed Care as the Relevant Standard of Professional Judgment
in Claims Challenging the State’s Treatment of a Detained Child
Under the Professional Judgment Standard
If state officials who oversee detention centers housing children fail to
implement or follow trauma-informed care, more detained children may
bring Section 1983 claims alleging violations of their constitutional rights
due to the State’s failure to comply with the professional judgment
standard.303 They may also seek prospective injunctive relief to prevent
future violations of their constitutional rights.304 Courts that hear these cases
would benefit from clear documentation with which to evaluate whether the
State complied with the accepted practices (i.e., trauma-informed care)
within the field of caring for detained children in order to determine if the
State satisfied the professional judgment standard.305
One way to ensure the court receives the documentation it needs to
evaluate a detained child’s Section 1983 or prospective injunctive relief claim
is to create advocacy packets that a child’s attorney could submit to the court
to demonstrate that trauma-informed care is the appropriate standard of
professional judgment for detained children.306 Advocacy packets would
300. See supra note 299.
301. See supra note 298298 (explaining that NCTSN includes a “unique network of frontline
providers, family members, researchers, and national partners” in 116 NCTSN-funded centers
throughout the United States).
302. See supra Section III.A.
303. See supra Section II.B.1.
304. See Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment permits suits
for prospective injunctive relief against state officials acting in violation of federal law. This
standard allows courts to order prospective relief . . . as well as measures ancillary to appropriate
prospective relief.” (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908))).
305. See supra Section II.B.
306. See supra Section II.B.1.
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compile reports and statements from professional organizations focused on
detained children—such as the documentation relied upon in Section II.B.1,
above—into a central database that could be accessed, downloaded, and
modified as necessary by attorneys pursuing Section 1983 and prospective
injunctive relief claims on behalf of detained children.307 The packets would
also include documentation revealing that ORR and OJJPD both required
detention centers to implement trauma-informed care and provided resources
to enable implementation, which would demonstrate that the state officials
overseeing the detention center had both the mandate and the means to
practice trauma-informed care.308
Compiling documentation in this way would shorten research time for
attorneys and ensure that they are able to present the court with robust
evidence in support of their argument that trauma-informed care is the
relevant standard of professional judgment for their claim.309 Additionally,
filing the advocacy packet with the court would enable attorneys to overcome
the presumption of validity traditionally afforded to a professional’s
judgment.310 The advocacy packet would also provide the court with a
detailed record upon which to evaluate whether the State complied with
trauma-informed care in its treatment of the child.
The advocacy packets should be housed on the websites of
organizations that support attorneys who represent children charged with
delinquency and attorneys who represent UCs. There are a variety of
organizations involved in this work.311 The National Center for Youth Law
307. See supra Section II.B.1.
308. See supra Section III.A.
309. See supra Section II.B.1.
310. As explained above in Section I.C.2, the presumption of validity afforded to a professional’s
decision under the professional judgment standard may be rebutted with evidence that the
professional’s decision substantially departed from accepted professional standards. See supra note
125 and accompanying text. The advocacy packet would serve as that rebutting evidence.
311. See, e.g., About, JUV. LAW CTR., https://jlc.org/about (last visited Feb. 25, 2022) (stating
that the “Juvenile Law Center was the first nonprofit, public interest law firm for children” in the
United States); About NCYL, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, https://youthlaw.org/about-us (last
visited May 1, 2022) (explaining that NCYL’s mission is to “[c]enter [y]outh through impact
litigation, policy advocacy, collaboration and research”); About NJDC, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER
CTR., https://njdc.info/about-njdc/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2022) (stating that the National Juvenile
Defender Center “was created . . . to respond to the critical need to build the capacity of the juvenile
defense bar and to improve access to counsel and quality of representation for children in the justice
system”); Legal Services, KIDS IN NEED OF DEF., https://supportkind.org/what-we-do/legalservices/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2022) (explaining that Kids in Need of Defense “helps immigrant and
refugee children who come to the United States without a parent or legal guardian” by partnering
with pro bono attorneys); Legal Services for Unaccompanied Children, VERA INST. OF JUST.,
https://www.vera.org/projects/legal-services-for-unaccompanied-children (last visited Feb. 25,
2022) (stating that the Vera Institute of Justice “works to preserve the rights of tens of thousands of
migrant children, by partnering with a network of legal service providers across the U.S. who inform
these children of their rights under U.S. law and defend them in their legal proceedings”).
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(“NCYL”) in particular is an excellent home base for the advocacy packets
because of their expertise on issues facing both immigrant children and
children in the juvenile justice system, as well as their advocacy and impact
litigation work.312
NCYL could tailor the advocacy packets to each child population (one
packet for claims by UCs, one packet for claims by allegedly delinquent
children) and monitor professional organizations focused on detained
children for updates to the literature as needed. NCYL also appears to have
the capacity to collaborate with attorneys who bring Section 1983 or
prospective injunctive relief claims on behalf of detained children.313
Litigation collaboration, combined with the advocacy packets, could
encourage more attorneys to represent detained children in these claims,
which could ultimately lead to fewer detained children being subjected to
unconstitutional standards of care.
C. Courts Must be Trauma-Informed
Efforts to implement trauma-informed care for detained children must
extend to the courts that oversee their legal claims. A UC may go before an
immigration court to defend against their removal from the United States,
and an allegedly delinquent child may go before a juvenile court for a hearing
on the delinquency charges against them.314 Either group of children may
come before yet another court if they bring a Section 1983 or prospective
injunctive relief claim alleging that the State failed to comply with the
professional judgment standard.315 A detained child’s need for traumainformed care does not end when they exit the detention center; it follows
them into the courtroom.316 And the State’s interest in maintaining the
welfare of children applies equally in a courthouse setting as in a detention
312. See Immigration, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, https://youthlaw.org/focusareas/immigration (last visited May 2, 2022) (summarizing NCYL’s immigration expertise); Youth
Justice, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, https://youthlaw.org/focus-areas/youth-justice (last visited
May 2, 2022) (summarizing NCYL’s juvenile justice expertise); Legal Advocacy & Impact
Litigation, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW, https://youthlaw.org/legal-advocacy-impact-litigation
(last visited May 2, 2022) (providing an overview of NCYL’s current and previous impact litigation
cases).
313. See Legal Advocacy & Impact Litigation, NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW,
https://youthlaw.org/legal-advocacy-impact-litigation (last visited May 2, 2022) (“[NCYL] work[s]
strategically and collaboratively with co-counsel partners, community organizations, and named
plaintiffs . . . .”).
314. See About the Office, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (May 18, 2022),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/about-office (“[The Executive Office for Immigration Review]
interprets and administers federal immigration laws by conducting immigration court proceedings,
appellate reviews, and administrative hearings.”); OJJDP, Structure & Process, supra note 220
(describing the structure of the juvenile justice system).
315. See supra Section III.B.
316. See supra Section II.B.2.
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setting.317 Therefore, it is in the interest of both the child and the State that
the judges and court staff who interact with detained children be traumainformed.318
Many juvenile courts have already begun to accept and implement
trauma-informed approaches.319 For courts that have not yet implemented
trauma-informed approaches, or that seek ongoing trauma-informed
education, NCTSN remains an excellent resource.320 NCTSN has multiple
trauma-informed trainings and resources available for courts and judges,
including self-assessments for courts to determine next steps for
implementing trauma-informed practices and trauma-informed judicial
decision-making guides.321
As is true for detention centers and children’s rights attorneys, a central
reference point for trauma-informed resources would be useful for courts.322
The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges (“NCJFCJ”) is
already fulfilling this role for juvenile courts interacting with allegedly
delinquent children by conducting court trauma assessments and suggesting
improvements.323 In addition to its assessments and court-specific
recommendations, NCJFCJ might also recommend and share NCTSN
trauma-informed resources to help juvenile courts move towards traumainformed approaches even before NCJFCJ is able to conduct an in-depth
317. See supra Section II.B.2.
318. See supra Section II.B.2.
319. Trauma-informed Courts, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUV. & FAM. CT. JUDGES,
https://www.ncjfcj.org/child-welfare-and-juvenile-law/trauma-informed-courts/ (last visited Feb.
27, 2022) (explaining that the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges conducts court
trauma assessments “designed to promote research in the area of juvenile . . . courts’ responses to
children, youth, and families who are exposed to violence and could be experiencing trauma”).
320. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
321. See, e.g., How to Create a Trauma-Informed Program to Help Young Children in Juvenile
Court, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/how-createtrauma-informed-program-help-young-children-juvenile-court (last visited Feb. 27, 2022);
Trauma-Informed Juvenile Court Self-Assessment, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/trauma-informed-juvenile-court-self-assessment (last visited Feb.
27, 2022); NCTSN Bench Cards for the Trauma-Informed Judge, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC STRESS
NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/nctsn-bench-cards-trauma-informed-judge
(last
visited Feb. 27, 2022); NCTSN Bench Card for Juvenile Court Judges: Newcomer Immigrant Youth
in Juvenile Justice Court Proceedings – A Trauma-Informed Approach, NAT’L CHILD TRAUMATIC
STRESS NETWORK, https://www.nctsn.org/resources/nctsn-bench-card-newcomer-immigrantyouth (last visited Feb. 27, 2022); Ten Things Every Juvenile Court Judge Should Know About
Trauma
and
Delinquency,
NAT’L
CHILD
TRAUMATIC
STRESS
NETWORK,
https://www.nctsn.org/resources/ten-things-every-juvenile-court-judge-should-know-abouttrauma-and-delinquency (last visited Feb. 27, 2022).
322. See supra Sections III.A, III.B.
323. See supra note 319 (“[T]he NCJFCJ has conducted more than [thirty-five] court trauma
assessments in a diverse selection of juvenile and family, tribal, and state courts from around the
country . . . . Each site received a report detailing concrete and tailored recommendations as to how
they can be more trauma-responsive.”).
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assessment. The U.S. Department of Justice’s Executive Office for
Immigration Review, which operates all the immigration courts in the United
States,324 should implement a similar court-by-court evaluation and
recommendation approach to NCJFCJ. It could also benefit from distributing
NCTSN resources and trainings to its judges and court staff. Both the
juvenile and immigration courts should do everything in their power to
implement trauma-informed approaches to ensure their proceedings do not
re-traumatize the children who come before them.
IV. CONCLUSION
When the State detains an individual against their will, it assumes the
responsibility to ensure their safety and well-being.325 When the State detains
a child, that responsibility is even more serious because of the inherent
vulnerability of children, and the fact that the majority of detained children
have experienced trauma.326 Courts, as well as the State, need a clear
standard by which to measure whether the State’s treatment of a detained
child is constitutional.327 A revitalized professional judgment standard
provides such guidance, and the trauma-informed care required by the
revitalized standard best accounts for both the child’s interest in preventing
re-traumatization and the State’s interest in protecting the welfare of
children.328 Trauma-informed care is achievable for detained children: The
State, attorneys, and courts just need to act.329

324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

See supra note 314.
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199–200 (1989).
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.
See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra Part III.

